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Abstract

A large literature on African economies argues that ethnicity plays a role in the politics and economics of African countries.
Unfortunately, much of this literature is speculative or anecdotal because of the lack of data, with the exception of a few
papers that examine ethnic networking as a business or employment strategy. In many ways Africa’s failure to develop is a
failure of nationhood. Creating nation is handicapped by the use of ethnicity. In this paper, I empirically examine the
relationship between employment, wages and ethnicity in Africa via a case study of Kenya. I challenge the pervasive view
that ethnicity in Africa is related to a primordial instinct and attempt to show empirically that ethnicity is used by politicians
as a political strategy to maintain power. In the process of using ethnicity, class solidarity is explicitly down played by
politicians as ethnicity is reified. In this paper I specifically examine whether jobs are being used by politicians as both
reward and carrot to ensure ethnic allegiances. This is done by testing whether being a member of a dominant group (in
terms of population and also politically) has an impact on the possibility of employment and the level of wages. I do this
using data from the 1986 Labour Force Survey which due to timing, uniquely allows me to connect ethnicity and income. I
group the observation into 5 groups that are ranked based on kind of employment and wage. Of the five sectors the two
desirable sectors are Self-employed above median income and Full time employment above median income. I test
whether ethnicity has an impact of one being employed in these sectors. By inter‐acting the dummy variable for dominant
group in population and the ethnic dummy, I am able to separate out what may be returns just due to ethnic networking
that comes from common culture, language etc and returns which are due in some sense to being from a politically
dominant ethnicity. I am also able to test for the impact in a change in the ethnicity of the president (a further test of
ethnic dominance) by using a difference in difference approach. I find that being in a politically dominant group improves
one’s chances of obtaining a full time above median wage job. In fact this improvement in chances was highly correlated
with political power and a change of ethnicity of the president resulted in a decrease in the probabilities of the past
presidents “kinsfolk” being in desired sectors. Being a member of a locally dominant group in terms of population as
compared to a politically dominant national group has no effect on likelihood of employment in one of the premium
categories. My findings support the view that in a highly centralized state ethnicity can be reproduced via preferential
employment to members of an in-group thus diminishing class solidarity that one may expect to occur between
workmates.
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Introduction
It is difficult if near not impossible to discuss African development and politics without the mention of
ethnicity or more conventionally “tribalism”. 1 For many scholars and at the popular level “tribalism” is
one of (if not the major) the contributing factors to instability in Africa and the failure, or slow pace of
African development. In fact today’s bête noir of development, namely corruption, is often seen as
pervasive in the African context because of the existence of “tribalism”. Traditionally in modernist
discourse “tribes” and “tribal” affinity were seen as fixed markers of a primitive past that would be
eradicated with development/modernization. On the right, western and western trained scholars
imagined an Africa before colonization, that had no history and was inhabited by savage tribes
relentlessly at war with each other. On the left the image was that of the noble savage the custodian
of human nobility (Mudimbe 1990; Eze 1997; Hameso 2001) Regardless of side “tribe” and “tribal”
affinity were both a hindrance to modernity and explanations of Africa’s negative exceptionalism. The
path to modernity therefore lay in the destruction of tribes. From the right civilization would come via
education and religion (as opposed to “tribal” superstition) while from the left it would come from a
broader progressive territorial nationalism, education and working under capitalist conditions in urban
areas. This unilinear path to modernity took the unified nation-state as a given and its consolidation
along with development leading to the end of “tribalism” (Mkandawire 2003).

While Africans struggled with these perceptions of themselves, they also mostly bought in to this
trope, and post independence political speeches were studded with references against the ills of
We use “tribe”, “tribal” and “tribalism” in quotes in the introduction only given its pejorative connotations and use
ethnicity in the rest of the paper.
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“tribalism”. Yet fifty years after independence for many countries “tribalism” is alive and well.. Because
“tribalism” is seen as innate 2 and ethnicity as fixed, there are few policy prescriptions other than legally
barring its practice and moral campaigns against it. We would argue that an examination of the
political economy of how identity is created and reinforced would help us understand the ethnicity
and its use in African countries and provide us with clues as to how to address this beyond simplistic
legal and moral remedies. In particular we would argue that understanding this political economy is
important in the project of creating a nation and the obligation of the state to its citizens – the failure
of which we would claim is central to a significant amount of African malaise (Gĩthĩnji and Holmquist
2011). In this paper we will examine what might be some of the political economy underlying social
identity and ethnicity using Kenya as an example. In doing this we hope to both dispel the myth of
innateness of “tribalism” by providing a mechanism by which ethnic citizenship is rewarded and also
the explanation that “tribalism” is a form of false consciousness.

The Road Well Travelled

Much of the discussion on ethnicity in Africa is found in the political science and history literature
particularly with reference to the reintroduction of multiparty elections to most African states in the
1990s. . The main themes covered both in the African context generally and the Kenyan one
specifically have included, comparative studies of ethnicity across African countries, ethnicity and
The perception of ethnicity as fixed and its accommodation is exemplified in the present Ethiopian constitution that
creates provinces based on ethnicity. The first Kenyan post-independence constitution took a similar tack, after revisions
the regional assemblies that tended to coincide with ethnicity were removed. The new Kenyan constitution has returned
to a similar formulation via the creation of counties. Given migration during the post-independence period more of these
are now multi-ethnic but they still substantially are dominated by single ethnic groups.
2
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democracy/elections, ethnic domination of the state, and ethnic violence and politics (International
Commission of Jurists . Kenya 2000; Mwakikagile 2001; Ajulu 2002; Ogude 2002; Omolo 2002; Jonyo
2003; Berman, Eyoh et al. 2004; Kimenyi 2006; Jinadu 2007; Branch 2011; Kanyinga and Okello 2011).
In the main because of the focus on politics there has been little focus on the economic basis of
ethnicity, although there has been passing reference to the unequal distribution of wealth and income
in the Kenyan studies. The result is that the policy prescriptions tend to focus on political ethnicity
often referred to as “political tribalism” and legal ways to contain it.

A couple of studies have made a more concerted effort at locating the unequal distribution of
resources related to ethnicity 3. Karuti Kanyinga (2006) enumerates the number of senior positions in
government including the cabinet, Provincial administration, Heads of government parastatals and
High Commissioners by ethnicity over time and shows how ethnic group representations shifts both
with changes of power and ethnicity of the head of state and the shifting alliances that the head of
state employs to maintain power. Jane Kiringai (2006)examines public spending from the perspective
of inequality, interestingly she finds less of a case for political interference in the mal distribution of
resources and more a case of the failure of clear guidelines for the line ministries of how to deal with

Here I am referring to the literature that focusses on ethnicity and individual economic outcome and more specifically to
the Kenyan case. There is a larger literature on ethnicity and development in Africa particularly as ethnicity relates to civil
conflict and also natural resource distribution. Examples of this are Ndikumana, L. o. (1998). "Institutional failure and ethnic
conflicts in Burundi." African studies review : the journal of the African Studies Association African Studies Review 41(1):
29-47, Ndikumana, L. o. (2000). "Towards a solution to violence in Burundi: a case for political and economic liberalisation."
The journal of modern African studies : a quarterly survey of politics, economics and related topics in contemporary Africa
The Journal of Modern African Studies 38(3): 431-459, Ndikumana, L. o. and R. World Institute for Development
Economics (2001). Fiscal policy, conflict, and reconstruction in Burundi and Rwanda. Helsinki, United Nations University,
World Institute for Development Economics Research, Nkurunziza, J. D., F. Ngaruko, et al. (2002). Explaining growth in
Burundi : 1960-2000. Oxford, University of Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies.
3
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inequality 4. Francis Stewart ((2010) also empirically connects the number of positions at senior levels
in the government to changes in power and the subsequent tensions arising out of such
redistributions of influence. Both Kiringai (2006) and Stewart (2010) also point towards the inequality
in other resources such as budgetary allocations, health, education and electricity resources at the
regional (provincial and district levels) and tie this to ethnic inequality based on the fact that there is a
fairly high correlation between regions and ethnicity.. The work of Stewart (2000)and Østby (2005)
and Østby and De Soysa (2008) while not limited to Africa points out how horizontal inequalityethnic inequality- leads to conflict. On the other hand Collier et al (2009) for example find that rather
than fragmentation which has often been used as an explanation for instability and lack of
development – it is ethnic domination that tends to be a problem as well as the availability of natural
resources to finance conflict. In their study inequality is not significant.

The literature in economics is not as rich as that in politics. Many studies are similar to the Collier et al
(2009) study that look a cross-country comparisons and the impact of ethnic fragmentation on growth
such as Easterly and Levine(1996). There import is however challenged by Arcand et al (2000) who
point out both the limitations in data and the lack of a mechanism through which ethnic fragmentation
works. Kimenyi (2006) makes a theoretical argument that fragmentation tends to lead to the under
provisioning of public goods.

We should note that the benign neglect of not providing clear guidelines on how to deal with inequality may be a
political strategy in of itself. If the wealthiest group is also politically dominant, it may be in the interest of wealthy
individuals in this group not to bring attention to the inequality in the group.

4
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There are a number of studies that look at the impact of ethnicity on individuals, particularly at the
impact on economic well-being or success at entrepreneurship. These include Collier and Gargs
(1999) work which looks at the importance of ethnic networks in entrepreneurship in Ghana, as well at
Fafchamps (2000; Fafchamps 2003) who points to ethnic network roles playing an important part in
receiving of credit for manufacturing in Kenya and Zambia and trade networks in Benin, Malawi and
Madagascar, and Addai and Polimica (2010) who explores the impact of ethnicity on well being and
find that it is important. While the economic literature looks at the impact of ethnicity on economic
outcomes it makes little explicit connections to politics. On the other hand the literature from politics
and history while carefully mapping out the use of ethnicity in politics cannot connect that to
individual outcomes except for a small section of the elite that are appointed directly by the president
(Stewart 2010, Kanyinga 2006). It is this lacuna that we intend to fill. That is providing a mechanism
for the rewarding of individuals beyond the presidential appointments that result in the creation and
recreation of ethnicity in Kenya.

Beyond exploring the mechanism of ethnic reward our paper is also an attempt to link three
somewhat disparate literatures namely the politics and the economics literature mentioned above and
the literature on discrimination and social identity that has developed over the years. This literature
which developed mostly in the United States to initially explain white versus black inequalities is now
in the form of the study of stratification examining the nexus between issues of identity and social
stratification world-wide (Darity and Deshpande 2003; Darity and Mason 2004; Darity 2005) While
traditional economics has in the main focused on the analysis of difference based on the outcome of
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labour markets, stratification economics borrowing from sociology, and other social sciences, seeks to
incorporate non-market explanations that are structural in nature. At the core of the enterprise of
stratification economics is the study of intergroup inequality via intergenerational transfers and
maintenance of benefits by dominant groups in addition to the standard studies of discrimination
(Darity 2005). This area of research allows us to examine the impact of non-economic processes as
well as economic process in the formation and maintenance of inequality. Another way of looking at
our work and stratification economics is that rather than treat group difference (horizontal inequality)
and individual difference (vertical inequality) separately, we attempt to bring them together and
account for the interaction between the two.

A Materialist Perspective on Ethnicity

Before we address the more specific Kenyan let us abstractly explore the political economy of
transition to capitalism and how ethnicity might mutate and recreate itself in the particularly
debilitating form that it has taken in the modern African context. Prior to colonialism and the
expansion of capitalism, communities constructed their livelihoods around access to land, and ethnic
communities not only shared a language and culture but importantly also a primary form of
production. We can refer to this primary form of production as a mode of subsistence. In many ways
then ethnic groups were essential different modes of subsistence (Marx 1993). Citizenship within an
ethnic group gave one rights to the complementary capital to labour needed for survival, in this case

6

land. This access was mediated by the local ethnic elites 5. In African countries as colonialism and
alongside it capitalism intruded land become more scarce, as one can imagine this had contradictory
effects. On one hand the scarcity initially gave the elites more power as land became more valuable.
In the longer term however if individuals were forced to find opportunities in the capitalist sector
unmediated by the elites, this would decrease elite power. This power of the elites would be further
weakened if the individuals were able to reproduce themselves wholly in the capitalist sector.

The ties between individuals from a specific community survived this transition for a number of
reasons. The first is networking. That is the provision of information and assistance on opportunities
in the capitalist sector as well as safety nets. It is well documented that early migrants to colonial
centres created social clubs and networks based on place of origin. These were used to assist
individuals seek employment, provide a safety net for crisis periods and most importantly to ensure
that bodies were repatriated to home regions so that individuals could be laid to rest among their
ancestors (Afigbo 1985). Over time as individuals and households depended more on the capitalist
economy, one would expect that their network for survival would become broader drawing both on
ethnicity and new networks based on production. The use of ethnicity here was for inclusion into the
capitalist sector. Of course every act of inclusion is simultaneously an act of exclusion. However in this
form, we would argue that the active part of the dialectic was the inclusions; the exclusion being
passive. That is to say that there is there is a difference between providing information to one’s fellow
villagers on the availability of employment in the capitalist sector, and actively blocking other groups

5

African ethnic elites were not only constructed along wealth lines, there were also differences due to sex and age.
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access to the same jobs. The pace of change in the form of networks of course also depended on the
extent to which there was a reservoir of ethnic labour that needed to be integrated into the capitalist
economy. As long as this existed one should not expect the use of ethnicity as networking to
disappear.

As we noted above the elite within specific ethnic communities faced two contradictory effects from
the expansion of capitalism, the first was a strengthening from the increased scarcity of land, the
second was the loss of control that came with members of their community leaving for the capitalist
sector in order to be able to produce and reproduce themselves. As long as entry into the capitalist
sector was unmediated by the ethnic elite this group lost some power and legitimacy.

Two feature of capitalist expansion particularly in most of post-colonial Africa allowed for the
recreation of ethnicity within a different mode of production. The first was the creation of the
territorial state that covered multiple ethnicities within it 6, and with it the creation of a territory wide
economy administered by the colonial authority that was separate from the local economies. This
statewide authority that later was the post-colonial government became the main arbiter of resources
in these new economies. Access to these resources required inclusion within this new authority. The
second was that inclusion into this authority depended on claims of representing a distinct population.
The number of individuals you represented thus became the currency for local elite inclusion into the

There were some instances where the colonial territory coincided with a pre-existing state such as Burundi, Rwanda,
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho.
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national elite. Under these circumstances the saliency of ethnicity for the elite becomes clear even
where the use of ethnicity may mean that many local elites may never control the national elite, this
systems allowed for their inclusion, thus they became arbiters of access to resources at the national
level for their ethnicity – essentially entry into the capitalist economy. This mitigates the loss of power
that would have occurred if individuals entered the capitalist economy as individuals. In short these
arrangements allow for the survival of an ethnic elite even as the ethnic mode of subsistence – from
which they traditionally derived authority- becomes less important. This mode of division of
opportunities with the capitalist economy is not one of networking for inclusion as individuals may do
to get access to new opportunities, but rather one of the active exclusion of others from national
resources as control of specific resources give ethnic elites new currency and relevance within their
own ethnic community. The inclusion of ethnic elites as elite in the national capitalist economy and
administration requires the active exclusion of the multitudes of others.

Ethnicity in the Kenyan Context

“The settler brings the native into existence” (Fanon 1969)

The question of ethnicity has bedeviled Kenya right from independence where it was couched as
regionalism. In fact at the pre-independence constitutional talks it was the major dividing line
between the two nationalist parties name the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU) 7. Initially the KADU position of regionalism or majimbo in Kiswahili

Tom Mboya argues that regionalism originally was promoted by the European parties that wanted to keep control of the
so called white highlands. See .Mboya, T. (1963). Freedom and After. Boston, Little,Brown & Co.
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won the day and it was entrenched in the independence constitution via the creation of regional
governments and a second house in parliament, namely the senate. This arrangement however was
seen by the ruling party-KANU - as limiting its power to create a nation, and develop Kenya and also
as entrenching ethnic concerns over national. In a series of constitutional amendment in the 60’s the
country moved to a more centralized model under the Kenyatta regime (Gĩthĩnji and Holmquist
2011). These concerns were rooted in the colonial experience which transformed how ethnicity was
seen and the relationships between people from different ethnicities.

Historically, ethnicity in much of Africa and in Kenya has been more fluid than our present day
conceptions. Scholars who have studied pre-colonial African groups and their response to crisis point
out that the survival of individuals in the face of a shock often depended on shared safety nets
between different communities. The specialization of different ethnicities in different ecological
niches8 often meant that shocks, such as drought for example, were not uniformly felt across different
populations. Those in ecological niches that were resilient to a shock were able to absorb “outsiders”
who had been more dramatically affected. For this to occur there needed to be a certain degree of
fluidity between ethnicities (Kjekshus 1977; Anderson and Johnson 1988) 9 This fluidity in movement
is affirmed more recently in the widest genetic study of African peoples (Tishkoff, Nyambo et al.
2009). In this study they find that in a number of instances that ethnicity as defined by language

Marx in the Grundrisse views ethnicities as different modes of subsistence. See previous section
In our narrative on ethnicity we do not mean to suggest that prior to colonialism Africa and specifically Kenya was an
ideal pacific area, but rather that the ethnic relationships were more complicated and included conflict, cooperation and
even assimilation. We focus on the fluidity of the category because that is what has been ignored in much of the modern
literature. Any acceptance that ethnicity is fluid then requires an explanation of why ethnicity may persist, which is what we
try to show in this paper.
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groups does not coincide with genetic structure of the population. For example the Jaluo in Kenya
who are Nilo-Saharan speakers are much more closely related to the Bantu speakers such as the
Abagusi, Abaluhyia, or Agῖkũyũ than they are to other Nilo-Saharan groups. Ironically politics in Kenya
ethnically has often been cast in terms of the Bantu speakers having commonality against the Jaluo.
The shared genetic structure but different linguistic tradition suggests that groups of one type may
have adopted language from another community or been incorporated into different ethnicities from
their original one. This fluidity around ethnicity also came into sharp focus around the writing of the
new constitution in Kenya as well as the hearings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
(Kanyinga and Okello 2011; Lynch 2011). In the face of discussions of ethnicity and decentralization
of resources and planning the number of ethnic communities demanding to be recognized almost
doubled from the standard 42 groups normally enumerated, as a way for different groups to make
claims on resources (Kanyinga and Okello 2011) In another example of the fluidity of ethnicity Lynch
(2011) ) documents how in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings, groups which
previously were considered Kalenjin have been making claims of being separate and independent
ethnicities.

If ethnicity was fluid before the colonial period, why was it subsequently viewed as more fixed? Fanon
once stated that ‘the settler brings the native into existence’(Fanon 1969). It was in the creation of new
states and boundaries both at the national level and the local level that the ethnicities that we refer to
today in African countries and more specifically Kenya became “fixed”. The creation and marking of
ethnic districts was the first step to the process. By reinforcing a fixed and inflexible space as
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belonging to a particular ethnic community some of the mobility that people had had between ethnic
groups was reduced. In addition the colonial authorities also sought to create new ethnic categories
for these and other purposes. For example in Kenya the existence of the ethnic groups, Abaluhyia,
Kalenjin and Mjikenda is a product of the desires of the colonial administration (Atieno-Odhiambo
2002; Lynch 2011).

The reification of ethnicity in the new colony went beyond the creation of new ethnicities and the
rigid relationship between place and ethnicity. The practice of national politics was handicapped by
ethnicity from the beginning. During the colonial era political organization was limited to the district
level thus forcing political organizations to essentially be ethnic organizations. These restrictions were
not lifted until the early 1960s just before the first truly national elections 10 . The national parties that
then came into being were therefore a coalition of different ethnic parties (Ajulu 2002; AtienoOdhiambo 2002; Gĩthĩnji and Holmquist 2009).

The modern bane of ethnicity in Kenya has been nurtured by the nature of the very highly centralized
regime inherited from the colonial era. There are two aspects to this particular institutional form that
create this result. The first is the fact that the Presidency inherited whole the provincial administration
- what Mamdani (1996) calls the Native Authority - along with its history of administration that was

It was not just politics that was restricted but at actual movement of people via the passbook system. This therefore
limited the imagination of Kenya as a nation by Africans. Branch (2011) points to this restriction in describing Musa
Amalemba’s leader of the Buluhya Political Union travel to Maralal to visit Jomo Kenyatta
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based on the idea that the appropriate mechanism of administration was through ethnic authorities11.
The provincial administration is the one arm of government that has a presence all the way down to
the village level and is accountable to no one but itself with the president at its apex. The second
aspect is a winner takes all system of elections in a capitalist political economy but with a relatively
weak capitalist class. In this context the state is a major player in the economy and the president
particularly has tremendous powers in making appointments to various state owned or public-private
enterprises (Kanyinga 2006; Gĩthĩnji and Holmquist 2011). These appointments then become a way
for politicians to reward supporters and to get access to state resources for political activity.
Nonsupport is also punished via the loss of jobs, as in for example the firing of Kenya People’s Union
(KPU) affiliated parastatal bosses (all –non-Gῖkũyũ) in the aftermath of the little general election of
1968 12 (Mueller 2010). A quick look at the distribution of employment between the public and
private sector shows the degree to which controlling the public sector gives control over a large
number of jobs in the economy

The public sector has always loomed large in terms of employment in Kenya. At independence in
1963 it accounted for just under 30 per cent of employment. By 1969 it had risen to 37 per cent
before falling in 1972 to approximately 32 per cent of all formal employment. Via expansion
particularly during times of economic crisis that proportion expanded again to 40 per cent in 1975
Kenyatta extended this idea to his cabinet by soliciting for the educated sons of ethnic elites to serve on the cabinet.
After absorbing KADU shortly after independence, KANU split up as the left wing of the party under Jaramogi Oginga
Odinga formed KPU. A constitutional amendment that required members of parliament (MP) to seek a new popular
mandate if they exited the party under which they entered parliament was hurriedly passed in parliament necessitating the
so-called “little general elections” of 1968. KANU under Kenyatta was dominated by members of the Agῖkũyũ, while KPU
via a brilliant but insidious strategy of challenging them everywhere but in Nyanza was marginalized and ended up with
only MPs from the Jaluo.
11
12
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and to approximately 43 per cent in 1986. For our analysis we are focusing on this earlier period
given our data, however for completeness we should note that public sector employment remained
at 43 per cent of formal employment till 2003 where it begins a downward trend that by 2008 left it
at 39 per cent of total employment, still above its 1972 level despite twenty or so years of neo-liberal
policy that focused on reducing its size. The early period including the expansion in 1973 allows
Kenyatta the first president to reward his supporters while the increase post 1979 including the
increase from approximately 38 per cent to 43 allows Moi the second president to reward his
supporters. These increases are even more important later on when the economy is growing slowly
and private sector opportunities are therefore very much limited. In our analysis later on we exploit
this natural experiment in the change of power from Kenyatta who was from the Agῖkũyũ to Moi who
is Kalenjin.

Given these institutions that allow for the existence of ethnicity, how is ethnicity mobilized in the
Kenyan context. There are four main avenues via which ethnicity is mobilized. The first is around
elections and in particular the presidential elections. Given the ethnic nature of politics in order to
compete for presidential elections one is forced to first mobilize one’s own ethnic block as a chip to
use to negotiate with other members of the political elite. These numbers are used to either make a
case for being the candidate for a party or to make demands for other positions after elections as a
condition for support. The second way that ethnicity is mobilized is around claims to national
resources such as senior positions or development projects. Ethnic elites often make these claims in
their attempts to ensure their own sinecures in the public sector. The third is around claims to land.
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With little employment generated in the formal sector relative to population increase, land has
remained important in assuring livelihoods. Claims of being autochthones are often invoked as a way
of getting access to land or diminishing the claims of others. The fourth invocation is probably the
most insidious. This is the grasp for ethnic support as a shield against charges of malfeasance. For
example senior politicians implicated in corruption will often rally ethnic cohorts to their defense by
claiming that they are being targeted for indictment not as individuals but as the leaders of an ethnic
community. By extension in fact it is the ethnicity that is being targeted (Gĩthĩnji and Holmquist 2009).

The result of Kenya being a divided nation along ethnic lines has resulted in regional outcomes that
are highly differentiated. In Table 1 we present the Human development index (HDI) and average
income for 2000 (UNDP-Kenya 2001). Because regions are somewhat coincident with ethnicity (see
table), regional difference are seen as and are to an extent, ethnic differences in economic outcomes.
A number of things are clear from the table. First, there is a large difference between different parts
of the country. With Income being 7 times as large in the richest region as it is to the poorest region.
The second is that Nairobi does much better than the rest of the country. The third is that the
ancestral homes of the presidents of Kenya, Central and the Rift Valley do better in HDI terms than
the other provinces, with scores above 0.5 while all other provinces are below 0.5. Kenya’s income
equality is also very high. Most estimates range between 50 and 70 (Githinji 2010). One of the
challenges that this regional breakdown presents is that not all difference is due to ethnicity, both
history in the form of where capitalist penetration was earliest and natural endowments also play a
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role (Ajulu 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). However, the political system rather than correcting for
these accidents of history and nature seems to have only exacerbated them.
Table 1: Regional Differences in Kenya 2000
HDI

Income per
Capita
16,406

Largest Ethnic Groups

Kenya
0.539
Agῖkũyũ, Jaluo, Abaluhyia Kalenjin, Akamba
Province
Nairobi
0.783
78,644
Agῖkũyũ, Jaluo, Abaluhyia
Central
0.595
17829
Agῖkũyũ
Coast
0.459
18,840
Taita, Mijikenda, Arab
Eastern
0.452
15,131
Akamba, Meru, Embu
Rift Valley
0.528
15,251
Kalenjin, Abaluhyia, Maasai, Agῖkũyũ
Nyanza
0.457
14,169
Jaluo, Abagusii
Western
0.445
11,191
Abaluhyia
North Eastern
0.426
17,212
Somali
Source: Kenya Human Development Report (UNDP-Kenya 2001)

The Questions and Data
Theorizing how identity affects economic outcomes is fraught with complications. In an ideal free
competitive market we would expect that economic outcomes and more specifically employment
would be primarily determined by ones human capital. However we do not live in such an ideal and
in actually existing markets other factors, such as networks, discrimination, etc. count. This is further
complicated by the fact that human capital itself does not appear sui generis but itself may be a
product of an individual’s networks and their prior accumulation of human and physical capital and
discrimination.

Given these complications how do we model economic outcomes for an individual? We assume that
in a developing country such as Kenya, markets are not complete nor necessarily dominant. Further
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historically different communities of the population come into contact with capitalism and the formal
employment sector at different points of history. The degree of contact is also modified by the
internal demographic and economic conditions of the community. For example favorable agroecological conditions and generous access to land may slow down movement into employment and
may favor engagement with capitalism via the production of crops for the market. On the other hand
a more limited agro ecological base may favor movement into employment but that would also be
dependent on building the kind of human capital that the formal sector demands. This may be
difficult under these conditions.

In the Kenyan predominantly agrarian context we model this as follows. Individuals on reaching the
highest educational grade they can achieve can “choose” between farming, self-employment, or taking
a job. In fact this is not really a choice because the sector one “chooses” to be in is heavily constrained
by the existing political economy and one’s own position within it. The choices of self-employment or
working for someone else is dependent on what you believe are your chances of doing better in
those sectors than remaining in farming. We will focus on urban employment and therefore assume
away the “choice” between farming and employment or self-employment. When making the choice
between self-employment or employment beyond human capital other factors come into play. Being
employed is heavily dependent on the employer’s view of you, as compared to being self-employed
where networks and access to credit may play a much more important role. Where much of the
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employment is in the public sector then the political biases of those controlling the public sector 13
(thus effectively being the employers) becomes extremely important. Where these biases include an
ethnic component, one’s ethnicity may be either a step up or barrier to employment. Those
controlling the public sector or populating the networks of different self-employment possibilities are
themselves however a product of prior existing networks and accumulation. So to properly account
to what degree ethnicity pure plays a role in economic outcome we must also attempt to account for
prior economic histories of ethnic groups.

As we have noted there is very little work that has empirically looked at the role of ethnicity in the
Kenyan context. More recently the government has engaged in a census of the ethnicity of public
workers. While what has been publicly reported has tended to suggest that the larger ethnic groups
dominate the civil service the publicly available reports have not corrected for population size nor
education(Anon 2011; Leftie 2011). In this paper we go beyond this simple enumeration by
econometrically testing for the following three questions. The first is does ethnicity make a difference
in the kind of employment an individual receives? The second is how is this related to political
power? We do this by looking at whether individuals going into the labour market after a change in
political power receive the same treatment as their ethnic cohorts who entered the market prior to
the change, while controlling for any secular trend. By doing this we are partially able to separate out
whether the returns to ethnicity are related to political power or to advantages due to accidents of
Although we mention the Public sector here – given the close relations between the public and private sector in Kenya,
we could have as easily said that most employment depends on who is in power as much of the private sector depends on
public sector contracts and licensing to survive. So the impact of those who control the public sector extends beyond
public sector employment.

13
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history such as an earlier or more extensive contact with capitalism by a specific ethnic community
(Ajulu 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). The third is does the impact of ethnicity disappear in urban
environments. Omolo (2002) for example suggests that increased material insecurity may turn city
dwellers more toward ethnicity than class. This is consistent with the literature in history which points
to urban ethnic organizations as being one of the new forms of institutions that arise in colonial cities
(Afigbo 1985). To control for prior accumulation we introduce agro-ecological controls for district of
birth as well as degree of formal economy penetration by controlling for prior levels of education and
the degree to which land has become a commodity via registration of title deeds. This is also partially
a reflection of the infrastructure of a district. Our model takes the form:

Ji =β0+βiHi+γiEi+δ1T+ δ2 (T*Ei )+ωiFi+ε
We answer these questions by estimating the multinomial logistic regression model above, where J I is
the sector of employment and level of income. The sectors are self-employed, full time employed,
part time employed and others, part-time employed and unemployed. Both the full time and part
time employed are divided into two groups by median income. The other/part time category is the
base category to which the other groups are compared. We divide the sample into self-employed
versus employed because we expect that the impacts of ethnicity on self-employed will be dominated
by network effects while those of the employed will be dominated by political power and
discrimination. H is a vector of basic human capital and demographic characteristics including age,
education and marital status,. E is a set of ethnic and spatial variables including whether the individual
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is rural born, their ethnicity and whether their ethnicity is the local major ethnic group in population
terms. By controlling for the dominant ethnicities locally we are also able to separate out the network
effects that Collier and Garg (1999) find from purer returns to ethnicity. Darity and Mason(2004) find
that the presence of same race individuals has a positive effect on income. We are in a sense proxying
for a similar effect. These ethnic and spatial categories in our most complete model also attempt to
control for prior accumulation and contact with capitalism. As noted above this is proxied by the
availability of favorable agricultural conditions which control for the potential of doing well and access
to capital as well as the stock of human capital in the community inherited from the prior mode of
accumulation and political structure. T is a dummy variable representing the year in the change of the
president. We interact that with the outgoings presidents ethnicity to explore the effect of the loss of
political power for the ethnic group. F is a series of fixed effects to control for the different
provinces.

We estimate the parameters using the Urban Labor Force Survey of 1986. Our coverage is national
in nature with the exception of North Eastern province a sparsely populated area that holds under 5%
of the population. The total number of individuals in the data set is 9500 in 2500 households. We
focus only on working males as is standard in the literature as a way of avoiding the endogeneity of
choice for women joining the labour force. Our data therefore consists of males over 16 not in full
time education. This leaves us with slightly more than 1800 complete observations. We focus on
urban employment for two reasons, the first is that is where most of the formal sector jobs are, and the
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second it is in urban areas that you will find a mix of ethnicities and therefore most likely some
competition for jobs.

The most important reason however for using this data set is that given when it was collected we can
identify the ethnicity of individuals via their districts of birth. There is a dearth of African data sets (let
alone Kenyan) that contain ethnicity, income and employment variables. Our identification strategy is
as follows. Because most working people in the dataset were born during the colonial era and given
the restriction of movement in colonial times, there is a coincidence between rural district of birth
(which is in the data) and ethnicity as districts were ethnically defined during colonialism. Because of
this the vast majority of urban dwellers are first generation rural migrants (Gĩthĩnji 2000). Therefore
by using birth district we can identify ones ethnicity 14. Where individuals are urban born we are able
to identify their ethnicity by looking at the district of birth of an elder relative living in the household.
In our sample over 80 per cent of individuals are rural born and 50 per cent have rural born parents
living with them. There are high urbanization rates for the largest ethnic groups who tend to come
from high density districts, with the exception of the Kalenjin who urbanised at a much slower pace
(Ajulu 2002).

We are able to confirm that the rural districts are indeed predominantly occupied by single groups by using the
Demographic and Health Survey 1989 which contains both data on ethnicity and local language. In all instances the
districts we identified had a minimum of 75% occupancy by a single ethnic community. In a majority of the cases the % of
population was over 90 %. We left out some of the more cosmopolitan districts such as Nakuru and Trans Nzoia where
there is a more heterogeneous population. As these districts are relatively prosperous and contain members of the
groups we are interested in we suspect that our estimates are lower bounds of the effects we are examining. Please note
that these numbers are the numbers in 1988 which is approximately 28 years after the restriction on movement. In our
calculations we are using the individuals district of birth. Since all the individuals are 16 or older we expect that the
districts would have been even more homogeneous at the time of birth of the individuals we examine.

14
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Table 2: Population by Ethnicity-Large Groups 1980 Census

Ethnicity
Population (millions)
Mijikenda
0.73
Meru
0.84
Abagusi
0.94
Akamba
1.7
Kalenjin
1.7
Abaluhyia
2.0
Jaluo
2.0
Agῖkũyũ
3.2
Source: Statistical Abstract (National Bureau of Statistics 1988)

Share of National Population
5%
6%
6%
11%
11%
13%
13%
21%

In 1986 Kenya was made up of 42 African ethnic groups 15 according to the census (National Bureau of
Statistics 1988) . In 1980 the groups numbered from 3.2 million in population for the largest groups,
to the hundreds for the smallest groups. In table 2 we provide a breakdown of Kenya for the largest
ethnicities. The top eight groups account for 86 per cent of the entire population. For our purposes
and also because it eases identification and provides samples large enough to give meaningful
statistical results we concentrate on the largest 5 ethnicities in the country, namely the Agῖkũyũ,
Kalenjin, Jaluo, Abaluhyia and the Akamba. Given their predominantly monoethnic home districts this
allows for clearer identification.

We present below in Table 3 the basic income and demographic statistics for our sample.

We should note that this number can be somewhat fluid. In earlier years for example the Kalenjin were enumerated in
separate groups thus leading to the total number of ethnic groups being larger. Also note the demand for the recognition
of more ethnic groups in the truth and reconciliation hearings we alluded to earlier.
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Table 3: Incomes and Employment by Employment Groups
% of Pop Mean Mean
Mean
Age
Years of
Yearly
(Years) Education Primary
Income
(KShs)

Median
Yearly
Primary
Income
(KShs)

All Urban

100

34.6

9.1

37508

16813

By Employment
Self Employed above Median Income
Full Time Employed above Median Income
Full Time Employed below Median Income
Self Employed below Median Income
Other- Part time Employed and Unemployed

8.3
31.5
26.7
7.3
26.2

39.5
35.6
34.3
41.2
30.3

10.1
11.6
7.7
7
8.1

85040
58874
10687
8576
9328

54600
31164
10808
9607
7800

The largest group of individuals is found in the full time employed above median economy followed
by the full time employed and then the residual category. The numbers of self-employed are rather
small. In both cases being fewer than 10 per cent. A number of other things jump out immediately.
The first is the inequality in a number of categories where the median is substantially higher than the
mean. The groups where this is the case, include the top two groups, full time employment and selfemployed above median income. As in other studies education as measured in number of years is
also striking, seeming to go up with income. The higher education for full time employees over the
self-employed seems to confirm the common place belief that education in Kenya is highly academic
leading people towards formal employment rather than entrepreneurial activity. The self-employed
are in two groups, the top income in this group given their relatively young age seem to have chosen
to go into this group, while the other group of self-employed with the lowest education of all groups
and low income seem to be individuals with no other choice. The lowest group in income is the
combination of part-time, casual and seasonal employment.
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Chart 1: Probability Distribution of Income by Employment

The degree of inequality in income is confirmed by the chart of the 5 distributions (see chart 1).
While the three lower income distributions are nearly indistinguishable, the huge inequality in the
whole distribution and the upper income groups is immediately obvious given the long tails. Note
these have been truncated for presentation and are actually substantially longer. Githinji (2000) finds
that contrary to the then assumptions urban inequality was high in 1986 with a gini of 65.2 in per
capita income terms.
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Table 4 is a presentation of the distribution by employment by ethnicity. As one expects those
ethnicities coming from densely populated areas are overrepresented in the urban population. We
can compare the proportion of individuals from a specific ethnic group to their proportion of any
sector. From these basic statistics the Agῖkũyũ are overrepresented in the high income category and
slightly underrepresented on the lower income categories. The Kalenjin are overrepresented in the
full time employment categories while the Abaluhyia, Jaluo and Akamba are underrepresented in the
high income categories. Interestingly in the low income categories there is a difference by ethnicity
and the Akamba, Jaluo and Kalenjin are underrepresented in the self-employed category

Table 4: Population and Employment Distribution (%) by Ethnicity
Abaluhyia Akamba Gῖkũyũ Jaluo Kalenjin Other
Ethnic
groups

All Urban

19.7

9.2

25.2

16.7

3.4

25.8

By Employment
Self Employed above Median Income
Full Time Employed above Median Income
Full Time Employed below Median Income
Self Employed below Median Income
Other- Part time Employed and
Unemployed

12.6
15.5
23.3
26.9
21.3

5.6
9.7
9.8
5.9
10

32.8
26.5
22.6
22.8
24.6

10.9
18.8
15.5
11.4
18.8

2.5
3.7
4.3
1
2.9

35.6
25.6
24.4
31.9
22.5

Differences: Myths and Truths and returns to Identity
In Tables 5 and 6 we present the results of regressions for the above median income categories. We
present the results without the fixed effects details for clarity as these do not an interpretive purpose
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but rather are controlling for other local effects. Our standard human capital and demographic
statistics act as we would expect. The chances of being in a high income sector improve with age at a
decreasing rate. Married males do better and education is very important. Being rural enhances
employment but is negative for self-employment. In terms of ethnicity being in the local majority is
insignificant or negative – a surprise. No ethnic group is more likely to be in the self-employed sector
including the so called “industrious” Agῖkũyũ. The Jaluo and Abaluhyia however are distinctly
disadvantaged. The change in political power as captured by the 1979 dummy occurred with a
slowdown in the ability of the young to enter these top categories, but significantly young Agῖkũyũ did
better in getting into the self-employed sector.

Variable

Table 5: Self Employed above Median Primary Income Results
Coef.
Robust
z
P>|z|
RRR
Std. Err.

Robust
Std. Err.

Age
Age2

0.290***
-0.003***

0.067
0.001

4.300
-3.780

0.000
0.000

1.336
0.997

0.090
0.001

Not Married
Education
Rural Born
Local Majority
Gῖkũyũ
Kalenjin
Jaluo
Abaluhyia
Akamba
Gi1979
Y1979
_cons

-1.602***
0.214***
-0.608*
-0.200
0.255
-0.019
-0.901***
-1.165***
-0.683
1.426*
-1.161**
-7.022***

0.386
0.034
0.235
0.337
0.425
0.677
0.327
0.420
0.560
0.748
0.486
1.974

-4.150
6.370
-2.580
-0.590
0.600
-0.030
-2.760
-2.770
-1.220
1.910
-2.390
-3.560

0.000
0.000
0.010
0.552
0.548
0.978
0.006
0.006
0.223
0.057
0.017
0.000

0.201
1.238
0.544
0.819
1.291
0.981
0.406
0.312
0.505
4.164
0.313

0.078
0.042
0.128
0.276
0.549
0.664
0.133
0.131
0.283
3.115
0.152

***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1
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Table 6: Full Time Employed Above Median Primary Income Results
Variable
Coef.
Robust
z
P>|z|
RRR
Std. Err.

Robust
Std. Err.

Age
Age2

0.427***
-0.005***

0.060
0.001

7.060
-6.420

0.000
0.000

1.533
0.995

0.093
0.001

Not Married
Education
Rural Born
Local Majority
Gῖkũyũ
Kalenjin
Jaluo
Abaluhyia
Akamba
Gi1979
Y1979
_cons

-1.036***
0.289***
0.325*
-0.890***
0.602*
1.002**
-0.459*
-0.508*
-0.676**
0.421
-0.452*
-7.506***

0.227
0.027
0.175
0.231
0.329
0.490
0.246
0.281
0.303
0.544
0.256
1.365

-4.560
10.920
1.850
-3.850
1.830
2.050
-1.870
-1.810
-2.230
0.770
-1.760
-5.500

0.000
0.000
0.064
0.000
0.067
0.041
0.062
0.070
0.026
0.439
0.078
0.000

0.355
1.336
1.383
0.411
1.826
2.724
0.632
0.601
0.509
1.523
0.637

0.081
0.035
0.243
0.095
0.600
1.335
0.155
0.169
0.154
0.829
0.163

***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1

In the fulltime sector with above median income there are a number of additional key results. The
first is that being a member of a local majority decreases your chances of being in this category. In
terms of ethnicity being Gῖkũyũ or Kalenjin, the two communities that provided the presidents up to
this time, improved your chances of being in this category. In the case of Gῖkũyũ they were 1.8 times
as likely to be in this sector as compared to members of other ethnic groups, while in the case of the
Kalenjin it is 2.7 times. On the other hand all the other three main communities are less likely to be in
this group. The change in regime in 1979 resulted in the Gῖkũyũ who graduated after 1979 being less
likely to be in this sector. This is consistent with our earlier results of this group being more likely to
join the highly paid portion of the self-employed sector.
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In tables 7 and 8 we present the below median income groups. Again the human capital and
demographic variables act as expected. Notably rural born individuals are more likely to be in these
categories. In terms of ethnicity there seems to be little network effect in the self-employed sector,
apart from Jaluo being less likely to be in the sector. Most ethnic variables are however insignificant
suggesting that sorting into these categories does not depend on ethnicity.

Table 7: Self Employed below Median Primary Income Results
Variables
Coef.
Robust
z
P>|z|
RRR
Std. Err.

Robust
Std. Err.

Age
Age2

0.192***
-0.002***

0.052
0.001

3.690
-3.750

0.000
0.000

1.212
0.998

0.063
0.001

Not Married
Education
Rural Born
Local Majority
Gῖkũyũ
Kalenjin
Jaluo
Abaluhyia
Akamba
Gi1979
Y1979
_cons

-0.937***
0.024
0.367**
-0.961***
0.469
0.394
-0.593**
-0.047
-0.352
-0.420
-0.433*
-1.630

0.210
0.021
0.162
0.223
0.326
0.414
0.236
0.247
0.271
0.415
0.249
1.300

-4.470
1.120
2.260
-4.300
1.440
0.950
-2.510
-0.190
-1.300
-1.010
-1.740
-1.250

0.000
0.263
0.024
0.000
0.151
0.341
0.012
0.848
0.195
0.312
0.082
0.210

0.392
1.024
1.444
0.383
1.598
1.484
0.553
0.954
0.704
0.657
0.648

0.082
0.022
0.234
0.085
0.522
0.614
0.131
0.235
0.191
0.273
0.161

***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1
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Table 8: Full Time Employed below Median Primary Income Results
Variables
Coef.
Robust
z
P>|z|
RRR
Std. Err.

Robust
Std. Err.

Age
Age2

0.253***
-0.002***

0.060
0.001

4.190
-3.880

0.000
0.000

1.288
0.998

0.078
0.001

Not Married
Education
Rural Born
Local Majority
Gῖkũyũ
Kalenjin
Jaluo
Abaluhyia
Akamba
Gi1979
Y1979
_cons

-1.439***
0.060*
0.535*
0.331
-0.029
-0.762
-0.398
-0.410
-0.122
0.492
-0.153
-7.119***

0.385
0.033
0.278
0.309
0.458
0.840
0.534
0.378
0.494
0.849
0.594
1.744

-3.730
1.810
1.920
1.070
-0.060
-0.910
-0.750
-1.080
-0.250
0.580
-0.260
-4.080

0.000
0.071
0.054
0.284
0.950
0.365
0.456
0.278
0.805
0.562
0.797
0.000

0.237
1.062
1.707
1.392
0.971
0.467
0.672
0.664
0.885
1.636
0.858

0.091
0.035
0.475
0.430
0.445
0.392
0.359
0.251
0.437
1.389
0.509

***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1

While we are heartened by our results which generally conform with much of what is anecdotally
suggested of Kenya, we understand that the relationship between ethnicity and economic
opportunity is more complex than we have so far depicted. Economic opportunity is dependent not
only on an individual’s human capital and networks but also the historical endowment to which an
individual may have access. In the context of a young capitalist nation, these may include the length of
contact with capitalist institutions that one’s ethnic community has had, and the wealth of predecessors
in prior periods. In the Kenyan context what we mean is that it may be possible that over and above
advantages bestowed by present political power, individual opportunities may be somewhat path
dependent based on the time of initial contact with capitalism of the individuals community, their
initial endowment of wealth (in most cases the amount and quality of land held) and the subsequent

29

development of capitalism. In an ideal world we would have data from this period in the 1800s as
control variables. However since our concern is how politics has been intertwined with economic
opportunity, if we can control for the starting point at independence or close to it, it will help us
distinguish between what is starting point bias and what has been due to the politics of independent
Kenya.
To control for the starting point bias we create five new variables at the district level. The data is
obtained from the statistical abstracts of Kenya for various years. At independence most African
wealth was held in land. The industrial and service sectors were dominated by Europeans and Asians.
To measure the African wealth and its relation to ethnicity we create five land variables that capture
land availability and the development of tenurial practices in 1965/66. We also provide a measure of
how the availability of land has changed between 1965/66 to 1986. The variables are found in Table
9 with complete descriptions. For land availability we measure not only land availability per capita but
also the availability of high quality land in each district. This helps control for the variability of land in
each district. This is particularly important in the case of agriculture which in Kenya is dominated by
rain-fed agriculture. We also try to capture the degree of capitalist penetration within a district by
measuring the proportion of land which was registered and therefore titled in 1965/66 at the district
level, as well as the proportion of land that was scheduled and registered at this time. This is a
measure of the degree to which private property had penetrated the district. The scheduled land
was land previously set aside by the colonial government for the settlement of Europeans for large
scale commercial farming. Beyond the wealth of the community in agricultural resources and the
degree of capitalist penetration, communities which adopted western education earlier were likely to
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be in an advantageous position. We also will proxy for the initial human capital endowment in terms
of education by creating a variable of primary school enrollment as a proportion of the district
population 16. In short using these measures we are trying to distinguish the role of inherited wealth
(land and human capital) as it varies by ethnicity.
Table 9: Description of Agro-ecological and Human Capital initial endowment Variables
Variable Name

Description

Total Land PC

Per capita land availability at the district level in 1965.

Good land PC

The Kenyan government divides land into three categories. The highest category
which allows for high yields under rain-fed conditions accounts for close to 20 per
cent of total land. This variable is a measure of the total land in this category in
each district divided by total population in 1965.

Reg. land (%)

The proportion of land that was titled in 1965 in the district.

Reg. Sch. land (%)

The proportion of scheduled land that was titled in 1965

LPC change

The change in total land availability between 1965 and 1986

Primary

Primary school enrollments as a proportion of district population in 1965

Because our results for most groups remain the same, we present in table 10 the results just for the full
time employed above median income where there are some significant changes. Our results are
consistent with only three major changes. Our new controls are not statistically significant with the
exception of total land endowment per capita, which is positive and statistically significant. For full
time employment 17 larger average land holdings per capita at the district level is positively correlated
with getting full time employment. Given that we have controlled for quality, and land was the largest
source of wealth, it seems that individuals from wealthier communities have some advantage in
obtaining employment. This may have worked through better quality education (which we cannot
While enrollment as a % of the primary school age group would have been a better measure, the proportion of
population by age group and district is not reported so we cannot calculate this measure.
17
this includes for the group below median wage which is also statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.
16
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measure) or better networks. The second major change is that for the Gῖkũyũ, ethnicity is no longer of
significance. This may be partially explained by the fact that on average the level of education as
measured by the primary enrollment as a proportion of population in 1965 was significantly higher
than other groups, and almost twice that of the Kalenjin who were the only other group that had a
positive correlation obtaining with full time employment. Lastly self-employed below median
income 18 is correlated to the initial educational average at the district level as measured by
enrollment.
Table 10: Full Time Employed above Median Primary Income with controls for initial
endowments at District Level Results
Variables
Coef
Robust
z
P>|z| RRR Robust
Std. Err
Std. Err
Age
0.511***
0.077 6.630 0.000 1.667
0.128
2
Age
-0.006***
0.001 -6.180 0.000 0.994
0.001
Not married
-1.328***
0.301 -4.420 0.000 0.265
0.080
Education
0.307***
0.034 9.080 0.000 1.359
0.046
Rural Born
0.322
0.582 0.550 0.580 1.379
0.802
Primary
9.668
8.407 1.150 0.250 15798 132816
Good Land PC
-0.372
0.330 -1.130 0.260 0.690
0.228
Total Land PC
0.105***
0.032 3.310 0.001 1.110
0.035
Reg. land (%)
-0.796
0.687 -1.160 0.247 0.451
0.310
Reg. Sch. land (%)
-0.337
0.692 -0.490 0.627 0.714
0.494
LPC Change
-3.095
4.652 -0.670 0.506 0.045
0.211
Local Majority
-1.293***
0.344 -3.760 0.000 0.274
0.094
Gῖkũyũ
0.807
1.035 0.780 0.436 2.241
2.320
Kalenjin
1.509**
0.731 2.060 0.039 4.522
3.306
Jaluo
-0.474
0.665 -0.710 0.476 0.622
0.414
Abaluhyia
-0.589
0.744 -0.790 0.429 0.555
0.413
Akamba
-1.562**
0.674 -2.320 0.020 0.210
0.141
Gi1979
0.516
0.804 0.640 0.521 1.675
1.347
Y1979
-0.328
0.330 -0.990 0.322 0.721
0.238
_cons
-10.048
2.616 -3.840 0.000
***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1

18

this was significant at the 10 percent level
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As we have noted earlier Kenya is a country of great inequality. This comes out clearly in the very
long tails of the distributions for the above median income groups as depicted in Chart 2. Given the
long tails it may be the case that getting into the very top of the distribution is dependent on different
processes. Given the fact that many of these jobs at the top would also be direct presidential
appointees we are also interested in seeing whether the lack of correlation between being Gῖkũyũ
and employment in higher level income groups still holds. We do this by re-categorizing our data set
into just three groups. The first group is the self-employed with above median income for the high
income part of the self-employed. Effectively the top 25 per cent in income terms in this group. The
second group is the equivalent group for the full time employed and the third group whom we
compare them to, is everyone else. Our results are reported in Table 11 19.

The results are striking. For self-employment after 1979 being a Gῖkũyũ meant that you were 300
times more likely to be in this group than people from other ethnicities. For full time employment our
previous results from our first round of calculations that being Gῖkũyũ improves your possibility of
employment still hold but the magnitudes have increased. For the top of the distribution being
Gῖkũyũ improves your chances by 17. On the other hand at this time the Kalenjin were not more likely
to get these positions at the top of the distribution, and being Kalenjin is not statistically significant.
Interestingly for the very high income being a Luhyia is statistically significant and improves your
chances by 5.6 times. Being in the local majority is no longer disadvantageous in this case. This
suggests that, it is through the incorporation of some local elites at the very top of the distribution that
the system is then able to bring in “outsiders” for the other well paid positions.
19

For clarity we only report the results of interest or those that have changes.
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Table 11: Self Employed and Full Time Employed above Median Group Income with controls
for initial endowments at District Level Results
Self Employed
Coef
Robust z
P>|z| RRR
Robust
Std. Err
Std. Err
Total Land PC
-1.485**
0.680 -2.180 0.029
0.227
0.154
LPC Change
-19.304* 10.699 -1.800 0.071
0.000
0.000
Local Majority
-1.846*
0.951 -1.940 0.052
0.158
0.150
Gῖkũyũ
-0.191
2.115 -0.090 0.928
0.826
1.747
Kalenjin
-13.281***
1.553 -8.550 0.000
0.000
0.000
Jaluo
-0.011
1.501 -0.010 0.994
0.989
1.485
Abaluhyia
-1.623
1.642 -0.990 0.323
0.197
0.324
Akamba
-8.484***
3.106 -2.730 0.006
0.000
0.001
Gi1979
5.949***
1.786 3.330 0.001 383.504 684.764
Y1979
0.086
1.276 0.070 0.946
1.090
1.390
Full Time Employment
Coef
Total Land PC
LPC Change
Local Majority
Gῖkũyũ
Kalenjin
Jaluo
Abaluhyia
Akamba
Gi1979
Y1979

0.047**
-4.943
-0.753
2.876***
1.068
0.120
1.729**
0.483
1.366
0.962**

Robust z
P>|z| RRR
Robust
Std. Err
Std. Err
0.020 2.310 0.021
1.048
0.021
4.508 -1.100 0.273
0.007
0.032
0.466 -1.610 0.107
0.471
0.220
1.155 2.490 0.013 17.738 20.486
0.973 1.100 0.273
2.910
2.832
1.030 0.120 0.907
1.128
1.162
0.909 1.900 0.057
5.635
5.123
0.961 0.500 0.615
1.622
1.558
1.088 1.260 0.209
3.921
4.266
0.505 1.910 0.057
2.618
1.322

***= p <0.01 **=p< 0.05 *= p<0.1

Healing a Divided Nation
Our results highlight a number of important things, affirming much of what we have not been able to
show empirically in the past but also raising or challenging some myths. First it is clear that Kenya is
horizontally unequal and ethnicity plays an important part in obtaining economic opportunities at the
top of the distribution.
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For all the premium sectors education as we expect is clearly important. The opportunity to
education therefore must be equally available to allow individuals from all corners of the country as a
starting point for joining the highest paid sectors.
For the high category self-employed sector, political power does not seem to be important except
maybe in the negative sense in driving young Agῖkũyũ to this sector after Moi took power. Our results
for the tail ends of the distribution suggest that this was a very strong effect. For older Agῖkũyũ there
entry into this sector is not significantly better than other groups. These results challenges the myth of
the Agῖkũyũ culture of independent industriousness which is often used to justify their hold on
businesses in the country.
For Full time above median income employment clearly political power is important. The ethnicities
of Kenya’s past two presidents do well here, which is what we would expect. Further we show that
post 1979 the Gῖkũyũ advantage is insignificant on Moi taking power. It is also the case that when you
take the initial endowments at district level in terms of human capital and land, the Gῖkũyũ do not
seem to have much of an advantage in the group as a whole, but do in terms of entry into the very top
of the group as shown by our test for the upper tails of the distribution.
Surprisingly being in a local majority is not advantageous for employment. This suggests that in fact
“outsiders” get employment. This is consistent with our model with a highly centralized government
being the dominant employer and employees being appointed from the center. All large ethnicities
that have not had a president do badly. Our test of the tails suggests that local elites do however get
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incorporated at the very top of the distribution, which is consistent with our model of collaborating
ethnic elites.
For the below median income employment, what is clear is that, ethnicity plays no role. Local majority
is negatively related to self-employment probably due to the fact that local majorities probably have
the most access to land. So if they are to be self-employed farming is probably their first option. Since
ethnicity seems to play no role it then begs the question of why should the lower income classes
accept the ethnic charade purported by the elites when they seeming gain little at least in terms of
employment and income from it.
Our work points to some interesting findings. We confirm the importance for a broad group of
people in the top half of the income distribution. That is ethnicity matters for economic outcomes of
those in the top half. We would argue that for this group these are the rewards to being an ethnic
citizen as opposed to being a Kenyan citizen. On the other hand those in the lower income groups
do not get sorted by ethnicity. This flies in the face of the modernization literature of both left and
right variant. It is the very groups who are expected to be at the forefront of modernization and
therefore not dependent on ethnicity who are most dependent on it, while it does not matter for
those below. Ethnicity trumps class for the elites.
We believe that the challenge facing Kenya first and foremost is that of nationhood. At present Kenya
is not yet a nation and citizens do not therefore hold politicians accountable on behalf of the nation
but rather do so on behalf of ethnic communities (Githinji and Holmqusit 2011). In this paper we
show why a significant number of citizens may do this. We argue it is not for some innate cultural
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reason but because there are returns to ethnicity for ethnic elites. This is at some level a result of the
large horizontal inequality particularly at the top end of the distribution. For Kenyans to transcend
ethnicity what must occur is the end of returns to ethnicity such as those we have detailed above. This
would require a large restructuring in the political economy of Kenya to ensure that people across
different ethnicities have equal access to the most lucrative opportunities.
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